Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Linda Kay Clark v. Cecil E. Clark : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mary C. Corporon; Attorney for Appellee.
Suzanne Marelius; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Clark v. Clark, No. 971635 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1287

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
CFU
2KE1 NO

<

?7^ir

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LINDA KAY CLARK,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
Case No. 971635-CA
Priority No. 15

CECIL E. CLARK,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appealed from the Judgment and Order of the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

SUZANNE MARELIUS #2081
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 531-0435

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
CORPORON & WILLIAMS P.C.
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)328-1162

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JUL - 6 1999
Julia D'Aleeandro
Clerk of the Court

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA KAY CLARK,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
CECIL E. CLARK,

Case No. 971635-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appealed from the Judgment and Order of the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

SUZANNE MARELIUS #2081
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 531-0435

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
CORPORON & WILLIAMS P.C.
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 328-1162

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I:,agc(s)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
T A B ! I Ol

i

V ' ' U i ' •!'! U! '

iii

JURISDICTIONAL AI THORITIES
T. \i-. <t

;;

i. K i i.nl!\<~.

2

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

2

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES . . 3
STAN

.r

'

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

General Background

4

B.

»!:.

7

C.

Post-Appeal Motion^

V ItiJK :-. • i p j l l i i

d Court

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

.... 9

ARGUMENT: MU TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING SO GRANT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR XUSC PRO TUNC ORDER. TO
SUPPLEMENT FINDINGS AND DECREE. AMD THE OBJECTIONS 'v )
THE ORDER VACATING DECREE
A.

B.

7
8

MARSH W I INt F ( H EVIDENCE
I.

.-

9

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Grant Plaintiff's Motion to
Enter Order Nunc Pro Tunc

10

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Grant Plaintiff's Motion to
Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce

12

i

C.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Plaintiff's Objection to Order
Vacating Decree and Order of Dismissal

17

The Bad Faith of Mr. Clark Should be Considered in Review of
the Plaintiff's Motions and Under Equitable Principles

18

THE ONE-YEAR REQUIREMENT IN THE UTAH COMMON LAW
MARRIAGE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

20

D.

II.

A.

B.

The Statute Violates Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution by Depriving Plaintiff of Any Means to Redress
Injuries

21

The Statute Violates Article L Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution by Violating Plaintiffs Rights of Equal Protection
and to be Free of Discrimination

22

CONCLUSION

27

ADDENDUM

29

n

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987)

16

Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993)

14

Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1986)

22

Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah App. 1995)
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987)

20, 21, 24
15

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Court App. 1992)

4, 13

Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977)

16

In Re Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah App. 1982)

16

Layton v. Layton, 111 P.2d 504 (Utah App. 1989)

15

Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993)

22, 23

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984)

22

Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (California 1976)

16

Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah 1988)

16

Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988)

15

Painter v. Painter, 152 P.2d 907 (Utah App. 1988)

14

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

3

Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991),
cert denied, 836 P.2d 1983 (Utah 1992)
Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994)

14, 15
26

iii

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(h)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5

3, 10, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2)

3, 9, 11, 21

Utah Code Ann. § 30-4(a)-l

4, 10

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Constitution of Utah, Article I (Declaration of Rights), Section 11
(Court's Open-Redress of Injuries)

3, 20, 21

Constitution of Utah, Article I (Declaration of Rights), Section 24
(Uniform Operation of Laws)

3, 22

OTHER SOURCES
Utah Law Review, Volume 1988, No. 1, p. 273

iv

25

SUZANNE MARELIUS (2081)
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 531-0435

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LINDA KAY CLARK,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
CECIL E. CLARK,
Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 971635-CA
Priority No. 15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Plaintiff") submits the following as her
opening brief in the above-referenced appeal:
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITIES
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order of the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rules 3 and 4, and U.CA. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(h).

1

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a final judgment and order of the Third District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, involving a common law marriage and divorce.
A Declaration of Marriage and Decree of Divorce was issued by trial court Judge Dennis
Frederick September 29, 1997. The Defendant/Appellee Cecil E. Clark appealed that matter,
which case is presently pending with this Court as Case No. 970635-CA. Subsequent to that
appeal, Mr. Clark filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Order Nunc Pro Tunc. On August 31, 1998, the trial
court granted the Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed a
Motion for Stay and to Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce and an Objection to Order Vacating Decree and Order of Dismissal. These matters
were resolved by Order of the trial court dated December 24, 1998, which is the final
judgment and order being appealed to this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the Plaintiff's Motion

for Entry of Order Nunc Pro Tunc, which would have validated the Declaration of Marriage
and Decree of Divorce which was being challenged by Defendant based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to violation of the time provisions in the common law marriage
statute?
2.

Did the trial court commit error in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Stay

and to Supplement Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and the
2

allowed a divorce trial on alternate theories set forth in the original Divorce Complaint in this
matter, other than the common law marriage theory?
3.

Is the one-year tin le limit ii i the common law marriage statute set forth

at U.CA. § 30-1-4.5 urn.-H1^national?
tiRMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Appellant sets fortl i in the attached Addendum, the complete code and rule
provisions referenced as follows:
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (common law marriage statute and one-year filing
requirement)
I ,.![•. Constitution, Artie1" T. Section V. Addendum 12^
I
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1

'Vmrt mi ist review the trial court's interpretation. < / ,,//. * . . n

:

nn,

§ 30-1-4.5 (1995 as amended) and Utah Constitution, Article I, under a correction of error
standard,

V -ivJ '

TT1 ^V- Appellate C o u r t s "correctness" means Mi<u r- •- particular

deterei ice is gi> • c: j i tc tl it z ti ial ; : : \ in I: s i i ilii ig c >i i qi iesti- ,)i is ;/ I ' la ' Sii ite i ' ! < >.m if, 8 ( :»9 I " 2d ( )32
(Utah 1994).
This Court must review the trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann,
§ 30 4(a) 1, tl ic: • n w : r „, o tu i .< ' stati itc , am: ic 1 i i ilii igs ; >i I I Mail itiff s n ic itic >i is. I n ider ai i abi ise <: )f
discretion standard.

1 rial c< n irts may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters, absent

manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Crockett v. Crockett,
836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992).
STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff submits the following as summary of the case and refers to the relevant
facts, as needed. A more detailed Statement of Facts is set forth in the Brief of Appellee
Linda Kay Clark filed in a companion appeal to this case, Case No. 970635, and those should
be incorporated herein by reference.
A.

General Background.
1.

The parties to this action had an 18-year solemnized marriage, which

ended in divorce granted by the Third District Court of Summit County on August 27, 1985.
2.

The parties resumed living together in October 1985, returning to their

previous marital home in Coalville, Utah. They later moved to a home in Magna, Utah,
where they lived together until their separation approximately 11 years later. The trial court
found that the separation of the parties on August 28, 1996 represented the formal termination
of their common law marriage. (Addendum 1, Findings of Fact).
3.

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Divorce alleging that the parties had

a common law relationship and that the assets and property of the parties should be awarded
on an equitable basis. She also requested that the marital estate be divided pursuant to
common law principles and, alternatively, under the theories of partnership, contract for
services or trust. (Addendum 2, Verified Complaint for Divorce, para. 6).

4

4.

/

Frederick who entered Findings that the parties met the legal requirements for a common law
marriage, including: the parties being of legal age and capable of giving consent; the parties'
cohabitation from

IVOJ

unui ivvo; tl le mutual assumption of marital rights, duties and

obligations; and the holding ou: t^ husband and wife and having acquired a general reputation
as sai i ie. I 'ai 1: v f tt le specific e v idei ice < >i 1 will lid i tl le Cc 1 ii t i i lade tl: lese findings inch ide tt le
following:
(a)

The parties filed ;ont
1

(b)

—rrnrd income **-v return* from. 1985 through
!

After an 18-year solemnized marriage, the parties were divorced and
resumed living together only two months after their divorce and
cc »1 iabite< 1. cc >ntini u n ish

thereaftei fc >i a perioc 1 of appn \ "-. •*

a

years;
(c)

Flail itiff kept tl ie i i lai i iec 11: lai ne c >f Clark, and IV It Clai k pui cl lased a set
Gf

(d)

wedding rings for her in 1989;

The parties established several business together, which they operated
jc 'in itly, ai K 1 I"1 i ti s Clai k ( • • : u I ;:e( 1 c J it a fi ill time t >asis in these bi isinesses
doing bookkeeping, payroll, and other office work without being paid
a formal salary; ai id

(e)

The parties established and maintained joint bank accounts, credit, and
purchased real property together.

5.

On August 13, 1997, at the close of trial, Judge Frederick made lengthy

and specific Findings of Fact and a ruling determining a common law marriage existed.
(Addendum 3, Text of Bench Ruling). A lengthy Minute Entry reflects the finding and ruling
of the Court.
6.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Declaration of Marriage

and Divorce were prepared by Plaintiff's counsel and sent to opposing counsel on August 26,
1997. Changes were requested by counsel and revised copies were sent September 10, 1997
for approval and were never returned and no objection was filed. A transmittal letter to the
Court for review and entry of the documents is dated September 26, 1997. (Addendum 4).
7.

The Findings and Declaration of Marriage were entered September 29,

1997 by the Court. (Addendum 1).
8.

Earlier in the proceeding, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Decree

and related documents pursuant to the ruling of Commissioner Lisa A. Jones at a hearing held
April 17, 1997, arising from Defendant's delay in providing discovery after two motions to
compel and the Commissioner's ruling that his pleading should be stricken and default
entered. (Addendum 5, Commissioner Jones' Ruling).
9.

A hearing was held June 30, 1997, before Commissioner Lisa A. Jones,

where she stayed Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Decree and ruled that discovery be provided
the next day. The proposed Declaration of Marriage and Decree of Divorce were filed in the
record unsigned.

6

g

Mr. Clark's Appeal.
Defendant Cecil E. Clark filed an appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals

on October 28. 1997, on two issues: the first, whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter
the c »i ( i e r < k c :laring the i narriage of these parties because the oi der was not entered within one
year of the termination of their relationship, as required by the common law marriage statute;

based on the evidence at trial.
11

"Hie above-referenced appeal was consolidated into this appeal as Case
• iei : I" tl i :' "I Jtal i Coi n t • :>f \ ppeals e •iritc: i • = .d Feb i mi y 24, 1999.

C.

Post-Appeal Motions Before the Trial Court.
12

Mr Clai: k filed a Motion

fri

dismiss for I ,ack of Subject Matter

11 irisc li :ti« : n i ai K 1 Me i i ioi andi n i: I. : i I I\ !a;; ] , 1998.
13.
an.

I laintiff Linda Kay Clark filed a Response and Memorandum of Points
>

*

a

Motion to Enter Order Nunc Pro Tunc on June 3, 1998. Both Motions were heard before the
trial i >urt ;• Asgust ?1. 1 0 ^ 8 . At the close of argument, the trial court granted the Motion

1998 hearing).
11

<i ii September ] 0, 19< )8, Plaintiff fih :d a Motion

Supplement Findings of Fai

i

^v

and to

nd P; IT; r

to Order Vacating Decree and Order of Dismissal. Mr. Clark filed no response to either of
7

these Motions and pursuant to a Notice to Submit for Decision, the Court ruled by Minute
Entry that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay was granted, and that Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement
and to Object to the Order was denied. (Addendum 7, Minute Entry Ruling).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court abused its discretion in denying the request of Plaintiff

to enter the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Declaration of Marriage Nunc Pro
Tunc to the date of trial, August 13, 1997, rather than the actual date of entry, September 29,
1997. The nunc pro tunc statute states that a court must simply find "good cause" for
granting such an order in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment.
Since granting of the request would have merely corrected a technical violation of the
common law statute and would have validated the findings and ruling of the Court, it was
error to find that good cause was not shown.
2.

The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the

Findings and Declaration of marriage in this case. This pleading acknowledged the Court's
ruling that the common law marriage claim was invalid and requested a determination and
division of assets based on alternate grounds set forth in the original Complaint, such as
common law principles, equity, theory of partnership, contract for services or trust. Similarly,
Plaintiff's Objection to the Order Vacating the Decree and Order of Dismissal asserted that
the ruling to dismiss the underlying action was overly broad and that the Court should
proceed under the alternate theories to make an appropriate evaluation and division of joint
assets. The Court denied these requests without comment or findings.
8

3.

This Court should find that the one-year provision of the common law

marriage statute is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to the case before the
Court. The application of the time limit creates arbitrary classes without any rational basis
for such discrimination.

This Court should find the one-year provision of U.C.A.

§ 30-1-4.5(2) unconstitutional and affirm that the facts in this case support a finding of a
common law marriage which meets the other elements of the statute.
4.

The trial court erred in interpreting the common law statute to bar entry

of the Findings and Order in this case beyond one year, based on a reasonable reading of the
statute and on the theory of estoppel. Plaintiff's ability to comply with the one-year time
limitation in the statute was substantially prevented by the conduct of Mr. Clark, who should
not be allowed to gain from this misconduct.
MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE
In marshalling the evidence herein, Plaintiff submits that there is only one
significant fact and ruling to present. That is the fact that Plaintiff did not meet the clear
technical requirement of the common law marriage statute by not having the Declaration of
Marriage and Divorce Order entered on or before August 26, 1997, which was one year after
the termination of the marriage, as found by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS
FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER, TO SUPPLEMENT FINDINGS AND DECREE,
AND THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ORDER VACATING DECREE.

9

A.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Grant Plaintiff's Motion to Enter Order
Nunc Pro Tunc.
This appeal is from a final Order of Trial Judge Dennis Frederick involving a

common law marriage and divorce. The parties in this matter had a 29-year relationship.
The first 18 years were pursuant to a solemnized marriage which ended by divorce in Summit
County in August 1985. A few months later the parties resumed living together, which they
did continuously until their separation in August 1996. The Plaintiff filed a Complaint for
Divorce requesting that the parties find a common law marriage existed and, alternatively,
that the assets of the parties be divided based on alternate theories, including common law
principles, the theory of partnership, contract for services or trust.

Plaintiff filed her

Complaint on September 20, 1996, and the Court held a one-day trial August 13, 1997. At
that time, a bench ruling was made finding that the parties met the legal requirements for a
common law marriage set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5. (Addendum 8). The trial
court made detailed findings referring to a long course of conduct and many categories of
evidence which met the required statutory elements. Mr. Clark filed an appeal to this Court
challenging the establishment of a common law marriage, and raising the question of the trial
court's jurisdiction based on the entry date of the Order and the one-year time deadline in the
common law marriage statute for the Court to make a determination of marriage.
After the appeal was filed, Mr. Clark returned to the trial court and filed a
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction based on violation of the one-year time filing
provisions in the common law marriage statute. The Plaintiff brought a motion to enter the

10

Declaration of Marriage and Decree of Divorce as a Nunc Pro Tunc Order under the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-4(a)-l, which provides as follows:
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good cause
and giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter an order nunc
pro tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal
separation or annulment of marriage.
The Court heard both motions on August 31, 1998, and granted the Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction. This appeal followed.
The Court erred in not granting the nunc pro tunc motion of Plaintiff. The
statute requires only a finding good cause, which Plaintiff has unquestionably shown in the
circumstances of this case. The Findings and Order of the trial court establishing that a
common law marriage existed for at least 12 years prior to August 1997 show that Plaintiff
met all substantive requirements of the common law marriage statute. Detailed Findings were
made as a bench ruling and subsequently a Minute Entry, on the date of trial, August 13,
1997. In those Findings, the Court made the required statutory finding that the termination
of the marriage occurred on August 28, 1996, when the parties separated and Mr. Clark
changed the locks on the residence and Plaintiff relocated.

The final Findings and

Declaration of Marriage and Divorce were entered by the trial court September 29, 1997,
about four weeks after the trial and thus one month beyond the one-year time limit of the
common law marriage statute. The relevant portion of that statute at U.CA. § 30-1-4.5(2)
is as follows:
(2)
The determination or establishment of a marriage
under this section must occur during the relationship described
11

in subsection (1) or within one year following the termination of
that relationship. Evidence of the marriage recognizable under
this section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved
under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
(Addendum 8).
The Utah nunc pro tunc statute requires only a showing of good cause for the
Court to enter an Order concerning marriage or divorce on a nunc pro tunc basis. Good
cause is certainly present in this case, given the Findings and Ruling of the trial court on the
existence of the common law marriage in this case. By failing to grant the Nunc Pro Tunc
Order, the Court ignores traditional principles of equity and fairness by relying on a technical
matter. The existence of the nunc pro tunc statute and its specific application in the area of
domestic relations law is tailor-made for a situation such as this. These parties have come
before the Court after a relationship of 29 years, nearly one-third of which was in a common
law status, and Plaintiff seeks assistance in dividing the substantial marital estate. The ruling
of the Court leaves Plaintiff without a remedy under the common law statute, which can be
easily corrected by the entry of the order in this case, nunc pro tunc.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Grant Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.
After the trial court ruled that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

rule on the issue of common law marriage, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Stay and to
Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. This pleading
requested that the Court stay enforcement of the dismissal based on failure to meet the
common law marriage requirements pending a decision by the Utah Court of Appeals on this
12

appeal and the previous one filed by Mr. Clark. That Motion to Stay was granted by the
Court.
Plaintiff also requested that the Court hold an additional hearing or allow
briefing to supplement the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
entered in this case September 29, 1997. The Plaintiff had filed a Complaint for Divorce
which requested a finding of common law marriage and which also requested a determination
and division of assets based on equity, common law principles, the theory of partnership,
contract for services or trust. Based on the taking of evidence which occurred August 31,
1998, the Court had sufficient evidence to make rulings under these alternate theories. The
findings made by the Court established that the parties had contributed to the purchase of one
another's vehicles, real property, personal property and business interests. It was reasonable
that the Court supplement the Findings and final Order entered in this matter to consider and
rule on the alternate theories which were properly pled in this case. Based on the evidence
already of record, it would be likely that Plaintiff would be entitled to a distribution of assets
and property currently under the control of Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark made no response to this Motion and despite the fact that it was
unopposed, the Court denied the Motion by Minute Entry on October 16, 1998. Again, the
ruling of the trial court effectively deprived Plaintiff of any remedy for the division of jointly
acquired assets and was an abuse of discretion. Trial courts are allowed to exercise broad
discretion in divorce matters unless there is "a manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819 (Utah App. 1992).
13

It is also well settled in Utah appellate law that to ensure that a trial court acts appropriately
in discretionary matters, that the reasons for the Court's decision must be set forth fully in
appropriate findings and conclusions. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993)
(quoting Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court herein
utterly failed to provide any findings for this ruling.
The failure of the Court to allow Plaintiff an opportunity for hearing or briefing
on the alternate theories requesting equitable division of assets is clear error. After the trial,
the trial court was fully informed of the extensive businesses and properties acquired during
this lengthy relationship, and of Plaintiff's financial need.

The Court awarded Plaintiff

alimony of $1,000 a month, attorneys' fees, and one-half the marital estate encompassing all
property accumulated during the relationship. This property included a paid-for residence,
a cabin, two rental properties, cash value in life insurance, businesses and bank accounts. All
these assets were in the control of Mr. Clark.

Failing to allow Plaintiff a reasonable

opportunity to address division of assets under alternate theories was a clear abuse of
discretion.
Utah law supports a division of assets under such alternate theories under many
varied circumstances. An example is the case of Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App.
1991), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1983 (Utah 1992), where the parties resided in a "marriage like
relationship" from 1980 to 1984, when they were ceremoniously married and prior to their
divorce action in 1989. The trial court made a property distribution of all assets acquired
during the relationship and not only during the period of marriage. This was challenged on
14

appeal and the high court upheld the discretion of a trial court to allocate property acquired
by prior to and after the solemnized marriage.

The Court stated that to do so, it was

important to categorize the property as premarital or marital and that the Court must first
"find unique circumstances that warrant disregarding the general rule that premarital property
is separate property." Utah trial judges have been given the broad mandate to make equitable
divisions of property in domestic relations cases pursuant to statute, U.CA. § 30-3-5, and case
law. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). It has been stated that the purpose of
property divisions is to allocate property in the manner which "best serves the needs of the
parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives." Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369,
1373 (Utah 1988). The Burke case sets forth a detailed list of factors for the Court to
consider in making a property division. In Walters, the trial court stated the general property
division rules and added that "where unique circumstances exist, a trial court may reallocate
premarital property as part of a property division incident to divorce."
Another example is the case of Layton v. Layton, 111 P.2d 504 (Utah App.
1989). This case involved a couple who held themselves out to be husband and wife for
many years and were never legally married. They raised four children, worked full-time in
a family business, titled property in cotenancy, although in separate names. The wife sued
for divorce in 1983 and later amended her Complaint to add a claim for partition. The trial
court found that a common law marriage existed, even though the Complaint was filed four
years before the commencement of statute. The Court of Appeals reversed the holding of the
trial court and found it had mischaracterized the relationship as a marriage. The decision
15

cites with approval alternate theories on which to base an equitable division of property
accumulated by unmarried cohabitants such as a finding of partnership, contract for services
(citing Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977), and Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106
(California 1976)), and/or a trust (citing Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), In Re
Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah App. 1982)).
Another example is the case of Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah 1988)
involving a common law wife bringing an action against the common law husband's estate
for declaration of rights and distribution of property. During their relationship, these parties
cohabited and jointly paid the mortgage on real property from funds in a joint account. After
her husband's death, the common law wife continued living in the real property and paying
the mortgage and filed a legal action alleging the common law marital relationship to secure
her interest in the property. The trial court concluded that equitable principles should be
applied to the marriage-like relationship and awarded her the residence. On appeal, Plaintiff
argued the court should find a constructive trust. Although denying her request, this wellanalyzed opinion suggests that the equitable theories of constructive trust or resulting trust
doctrines would apply. Plaintiff specifically argued this alternate theory in the current case
and, based on the ruling of the Court, has been denied an opportunity to present evidence and
briefing on that theory.
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C.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Plaintiffs Objection to Order Vacating
Decree and Order of Dismissal.
After the ruling of the trial court finding lack of jurisdiction to enter a common

law marriage, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Order Vacating Decree and Order of Dismissal.
Denial of this Motion was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. At the hearing held
August 31, 1998, where the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss, no specific findings were
made and only the granting of the Motion to Dismiss was specifically stated. The Order, as
prepared by Respondent's counsel, vacated the Declaration of Marriage and Decree of
Divorce in an overbroad and inappropriate fashion. The affect of dismissing Plaintiff's claims
under the common law marriage statute should not result in a dismissal of the entire case.
Rather, it only results in the trial court being able to make findings and a ruling under the
common law statute. The other claims pled by Plaintiff in her Complaint concerning alternate
theories of property division and principles of common law and equity should be unaffected
by that jurisdictional ruling.
The appropriate scope of the Order arising from the August 31, 1998 hearing
should be only that the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction under the common law
marriage statute is granted. Plaintiff should have been allowed to proceed with a hearing and
briefing on her alternate theories. The denial of this Motion by the Court substantially
prejudices Plaintiff and leaves her without a remedy for a division of property and support
claims.

17

D.

The Bad Faith of Mr. Clark Should be Considered in Review of the Plaintiff's
Motions and Under Equitable Principles.
During the pendency of this litigation, the Court made specific findings on

several occasions that Mr. Clark acted in bad faith. Plaintiff submits he should not be
allowed to benefit from this misconduct. The fact that the Trial Judge was fully aware of this
misconduct and addressed the bad faith in his ruling favors Plaintiffs request to have
equitable principles applied in this case. During the litigation, Mr. Clark failed and refused
to produce discovery which impeded and delayed the litigation. Plaintiff separated at the end
of August 1996 and filed her Complaint the following month on September 20, 1996. She
filed an Order to Show Cause requesting temporary support and a finding of common law
marriage, which was heard by the Commissioner on November 7,1996. The Commissioner's
Minute Entry notes that an evidentiary hearing is required for a finding of common law
marriage and reserves the issue for trial. (Addendum 10). Plaintiff objected to the ruling and
requested an evidentiary hearing but the trial court denied a hearing and reserved the common
law issue for trial. Plaintiff then served discovery October 16,1996, and after waiting several
months filed a Motion to Compel on January 31, 1997. No discovery was provided and a
second Motion to Compel was filed March 20, 1997. The Commissioner held a hearing April
17, 1997, and entered an Order that inadequate discovery was provided and provided 10 days
for compliance or Mr. Clark's pleadings would be stricken and his default entered. This
Order on second Motion to Compel Discovery Responses was signed and entered by Judge
Frederick on April 30, 1997. (Addendum 5). Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Decree
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and Findings, an Affidavit of Jurisdiction and Grounds for Divorce and Proposed Findings
and Decree on May 15, 1997. Mr. Clark filed a Motion for Relief and to Vacate Judgment
May 21, 1997, and a hearing was held June 30 before the Commissioner where she made no
recommendation on the request for declaration of marriage, ordered discovery and tax returns
to be provided within 10 days, and again suggested that a bifurcated hearing on the issue of
common law marriage take place based on the closeness of the statutory one-year
requirement. (Addendum 10).
The above history shows that Plaintiff was extremely prompt in filing her
Complaint and discovery requests and in requesting enforcement of the discovery sanctions.
When the Court finally ordered complete discovery and tax returns to be provided June 30,
1997, discovery had been delayed eight months beyond the time it had initially been
requested. This resulted in substantial detriment to Plaintiff in trial preparation and, in fact,
denied her the opportunity to present a complete case at the time of trial. This chronology
shows clearly that the delays were the result of Mr. Clark's actions and not those of Plaintiff.
A hotly disputed issue at the time of trial was the status of the marital residence
on Jefferson Road in Magna, Utah, that both parties resided in that home until separation and
which was fully paid for. From the time of purchase in 1988 until June 1996, a few months
before separation, the home was titled in the sole name of Plaintiff. A written agreement was
made in 1992 to transfer the home to Mr. Clark, based on a series of payments. Minimal
payments were made until June 1996, when Mr. Clark made a balloon payment and obtained
a Quit-Claim Deed. At trial, Plaintiff asserted that she entered into this agreement under
19

duress and pressure from Mr. Clark and that it was never intended to be a true agreement.
The Court found Plaintiff's claims of duress and intimidation by Mr. Clark credible and found
clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff was pressured and the trial court voided that
transfer. This episode shows the knowledge of the trial court of Mr. Clark's bad faith and
intimidation in the relationship, as well as in the course of litigation. Despite this knowledge,
the trial court refused to apply equitable principles and allow Plaintiff the opportunity to
obtain a fair distribution of jointly acquired property.
II.

THE ONE-YEAR REQUIREMENT IN THE UTAH COMMON LAW MARRIAGE
STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Utah common law marriage statute at U.CA. § 30-1-4.5 contains two parts.

Section (1) sets forth four factual elements which must be established for the Court to find
a common law marriage.

The second section (2) states that the determination

or

establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship described
in subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of that relationship. Appellant
challenges this language as violating the "open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution
(Article I, Section 11) because on its face it constitutes an arbitrary and unjustified
deprivation of the right to adjudication.

Appellant also challenges this statute as

unconstitutional as applied in this case, since it forecloses Plaintiff's rights to an adjudication
of a common law marriage through no fault of her own.
A critical case in reviewing this issue is Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918
(Utah Court App. 1995) where this appellate court held that the language requiring a
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within one vea:. i:. Bunch rhe Utah Court of Appeals held that the statute's plain meaning
required a "determination' • -: .Kuudieation" within one year of the termination of the alleged
common law i
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had been solemnized and no order under the common law statute had been entered. The trial
coi 11 t ( lisn lissed the Coi npla.ii it aftei tv • c ) eai s because tl le one-year pen .: • >_•- ..
4.5(2) had expired and the party seeking to establish the marriage had not complied with the
statute. In its opinior. f(u • airt of Apprab' did note that S-vtion *2) ^f the statute might
presei it a :: ; »i istiti; itior
not that a Petition or Complaint be filed within that period. The Court stated a party could
timely file a petition for determination and still not comply with the statute if the Order were
not entered within the o-"-A.

* :••• •'
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The Statute Violates Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution by
Depriving Plaintiff of Any Means to Redress Injuries.
q

*
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under the "open eourt^ prnMsmnot tiu 1 tali i ori^itntirn, \r' cle I, Section ' \-Amch reads:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law. which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay: an-.
*a•• .
> >\irud -r^in
prosecuting or defending before am iribunai -s\ this stau by
himself M? oiunsel \r •, ix i 1 caust u* whvh h- •*. -, p:u\\
Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking a remedy for rights accruing to hci b\
of a marriage-like relationship and asked the Court to equitably divide marital property and

address her support needs. The right to apply to courts for redress of wrong is a substantial
right and application of the one-year time limit to Plaintiff's case herein violates her rights
of due process and access to the Courts. Similarly, this Court has found unconstitutional a
limitations provision in the Utah Product Liability Act which barred actions without regard
to when an injury occurred and was not designed to provide a reasonable time within which
to file a lawsuit. Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp., Ill

P.2d 670 (Utah 1986). The time

limitation in the common law marriage statute deprives Plaintiff of a remedy which violates
this constitutional provision.
B.

The Statute Violates Article h Section 24 of the Utah Constitution by Violating
Plaintiff's Rights of Equal Protection and to be Free of Discrimination
The one-year time limit also violates the Utah Constitution, Article I,

Section 24, which states: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The
Utah Supreme Court has held this provision to be analogous to the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution by stating as follows:
Although their language is dissimilar, these provisions embody
the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be
treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should
not be treated as if their circumstances were the same.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). See also, Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah
1993). The Lee court explained that for a law to be constitutional under Article I, Section 24,
it is not enough that it be uniform on its face, "what is critical is that the operation of the law
be uniform. A law does not operate uniformly if 'persons similarly situated' are not 'treated
similarly' or if 'persons in different circumstances' are 'treated as if their circumstances were
22
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first, ii it applies equally tc ) all persons within a class; and second, whether the statutory
classification and 1;.. •jnu-rent treatment given tl le classes are based on (..ik-rences that
reasonably further the objectives of the statute. These cases hold that it is unconstitutional
to single out one person or group of persons from among the larger class on the basis of
1 i v < .**

-

is either a rational basis standard or can be a higher standard of judicial scrutiny if a
fundam.en.tal r iebt is at issue. Arguably,, the right to marry is such a fundamental right.
1

.

••

basis approach stating as follows:
Under the rational basis, or least restrictive standard, a statutory
classification is constitutional unless it has no rational
relationship to a legislatively stated purpose or, if not stated, to
any reasonably conceivable legislative purpose. A presumption
of constitutionality is extended h- statutes . . . anJ. Mint
presumption is sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of a
classification created by the statute unless the classification
creates an invidious discrimination, or bears no rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
Moreover, the
presumption requires a court to presume that the classification
was intended to further ihe legislative purpose.
L if at 580
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unreasonable classifications. One group can obtain judicial determination, of their common
la:v\ mai 1: iage w it! iii :i >:n.e year' and ai ic >ther year cannot obtain this determination. 1 Here is no
essential difference between these classes when they begin the process. It is thus reasonable

2,3

to ask whether the discriminatory treatment accorded these classes withstands constitutional
scrutiny.
As stated by the Court of Appeals in the Bunch case, there are many reasons
why a common law marriage determination may not be completed within one year. Simply
the process of discovery, intervening motions and litigation tactics can easily delay a domestic
law case and prevent a final order being entered within one year of filing. A common law
situation is even more problematic, as the parties may be disputing the date of termination
of the relationship which may not even have a final resolution until the trial and ruling of the
court, which could be well beyond the one-year time bar had expired. Additionally, it is
unusual for a case to be resolved by summary judgment or other intervening, final order
which could establish the marital relationship in a short-term, summary hearing without a
complete trial. In the case at bar, Plaintiff sought a determination of the marriage before the
Domestic Relations Commissioner on at least two occasions and the ruling was reserved for
trial based on the need for an evidentiary hearing, which the trial court refused to grant earlier
than trial. In Plaintiff's case, she also suffered from the litigation tactics of Mr. Clark in
delaying discovery for eight months from the time it was first requested. She filed two
Motions to Compel with the Court and a Motion for Entry of Default and that pleadings be
stricken. Moreover, at the end of the case, Plaintiff prepared and filed timely Findings and
Proposed Order which were sent to opposing counsel, as required by the rules. Counsel
requested revisions, which were made, and ultimately the documents were signed and entered
by the Court one month after the one-year time bar. Plaintiff had no choice but to follow the
24

expired August 2 6 , it would have been nearly impossible for Plaintiff to comply with
preparing and presenting final documents to opposing counsel and to the Court within the
stall it n: \ time • frame • 1 1 lis element of ti ial tactics and bad faith by an c >pposing part) w a s
unfairly ignored by the trial court when. Plaintiff asked for her nunc pro tunc n;hng and
present*....
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procedures of the Com t ii i this case and the Domestic Relations Commissioner's process of
hearing all preliminary matters before the T i a l Judge reviews them, resulted in periods of
•].

c

Plaintiff has attempted to discover the legislative history of the c o m m o n law
marriage statute to determine the legislative objective in this law A ntah iaxv Review
r

".• in ' e • flc >oi debate ai M 1 cc n lcli ic iei ; tl m t 1:1 le li
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note
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c o m m o n law marriage statute w a s as a cost-saving measure to curtail welfare abuse.
Apparently, w o m e n and .;
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with an employed domestic partner whose resources were not counted. Passing a c o m m o n
law n larriage statute would close this welfare loophole as well as remedy the inequitable
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employees. L uui Law Rc\icw7
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commentator

also suggests that the one-year time bar is ambiguous and unclear as it does not define what

couple declares that they are terminating their marital relationship but continue to cohabit and
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meet the requirements of the statute for more than a year after that termination, can they still
validly establish a common law marriage? Similarly, a strict interpretation of the one-year
time bar may result in a termination of the relationship when any one of the five statutory
conditions ceases to exist. Even a third scenario, a liberal view, holds that if each of the
statutory conditions has existed at some time in the relationship, then the conditions once met
are forever satisfied and the court is not precluded from establishing the marriage, regardless
of when the order is issued. To adopt this view without making the time limit meaningless,
a court would have to focus on one or more of the five conditions, such as cohabitation, as
representing the "relationship" whose termination would trigger the one-year period. Id. page
277, note 19.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah
1994) stated that the legislative history of the common law marriage statute indicates it is
clearly a codification of common law marriage principles. Significant in that legislative
history is the interpretation that once a common law marriage has been found to exist by a
court or administrative order, "it is treated as any other marriage for all purposes." Id. at 793794. There does not appear to be any specific history on the reasoning behind the one-year
time bar other than to venture a guess that it is to be a limitation on stale claims and to allow
a certain amount of closure in an important personal area. Against these possible legislative
purposes, this Court must measure the disparate treatment of different classifications which
inevitably occur as the statute is applied.

Plaintiff submits that there is no rational
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classifications which result.
I ..

\p|a«,i^ vY>urt cannot \..tc. .; rational rasis for such disparate treatment

or disci HM;I.!uoii, then the one-year time bar must be deemed arbitrary and unconstitutional.
This Plaintiff's view" of the application of the one-year time bar is that it is merely fortuitous
i

.

i

any reasonable legislative purpose. Plaintiff, such as the one at bar, is thus denied reasonable
access to legal remedies for reasons entirely beyond, her control. This Court should find the

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should j . ! : . - the one-year \in\< i ! i ; ;; u. the
c

•

•-

• * ^titutional. Further, this Court should find the trial

court's denial of Plaintiff's Motions tor Nunc Pro Tunc Order, to supplement the pleadings,
and UMicctior

. \ .u^i^g ::u Decree as abuses of discretion w hich inequitably deny

Plaintiff's access to a !•••.*•!! 'vnidv in this case.
Respectfully submitted this
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day of Ji;h, 1(>Q9.

SUZANNE M A R E L I U S
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
UTTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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ADDKNIMIM
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Declaration, Entered 9/29/97
Compl.ai.nt, September 20, 1.996
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Transmittal Letters to Counsel, and C< nirt, i \„i igust and September .1.997
Order on Second Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, enx-:: J .v.r

Judge Dennis Frederick's Minute Entry. Qcb-Kr
i
U.CA.

§ 30-1-4.5 (common law marriage statute)

U.CA.

§ 30-4(nVl (nunc pro tmc statute)

Commissioner Jones* Minute Lntr), juij i, 19^7
I Jtah Constitution, Article I, Sections 11 m d 24
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" . 1998, and. Order, entered
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Third jytfc>.i Direct
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERS' N
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-ooOoo-

LINDA KAY CLARK,

DECLARATION OF 'MARRIAGE AND
DECR EE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,

2 7. \ S ° 7>
vo - I, 17

v.

CECII E. C I A..E K,
Defendant

£ % 2 2> c-^
Case No.: 964904,144 A,A
Judge:J. Dennis Frederick

Fhe above-entitled matter came before the • our: !. : trial on August, 13, 1,997, the
I lonorable J. Dei inis Frederick presiding. I Vlaintiff A as pi esei n: in pei son and represented by
counsel, Suzan ne Marelius. Defendant was present in person, and, represented by counsel, Dean
,.dt)iL>Kie

* wi. -,^urt received and approved, the . .......ation »f the parties that i n the event

a Declaration of Marriage is made, that the marital assets would be jointly appraised and the
parties would enter binding arbitration, to divide marital assets,,,

On, the issue of whether a,

common law marriage existed, the Court heard the testimony of witnesses, received evidence,
reviewed the ' Court file and, record herein, a nd having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conch isions of I a,11 v ai i„c 1 goo< 1 < :ai lse ; ippearii lg therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1.

The above-named parties are hereby declared married effective October 1, 1985,

having met all elements to establish a common law marriage pursuant to UCA §30-1-4.5.
2.

The Plaintiff has established grounds for divorce from Defendant pursuant to

irreconcilable differences and Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce to become final upon
entry.
3.

The written Agreement entered between the parties dated June 26, 1992 pertaining

to a division of equity in the marital residence at 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah
84044, is hereby declared null and void. The Quit Claim Deed signed by Plaintiff, pursuant to
that Agreement transferring her interest in this residence to Defendant, dated April 10, 1996,
is hereby set aside and declared null and void. This residence is a joint marital asset of the
parties.
4.

The Plaintiff is awarded alimony payable by the Defendant in the amount of

$1,000.00 per month September 1, 1996. Alimony will be paid by the 1st of every month
payable to Plaintiff until such time as she remarries, cohabits, until alimony has been paid for
a term equaling the length of the marriage of the parties, or until Plaintiffs death, whichever
event occurs earlier.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment for alimony accumulated during the pendency of

this matter between September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997, in the amount of SI2.000.00
to bear interest at the legal rate of 7.45% per annum until paid.

2

6.

PlaintP

with the above-entitled action. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to subm.it an Affidavit of Costs and
. ;._„nt may
respond or object accordingly. The Court will determine the amount of fees and costs pursuant

7.

The parties are ordered to select a mutually agreed upon appraiser to establish tin1

current value of all marital property including the real estate and businesses established during
the marriage,

i'

- *

*•

i

select a mutual!) agreed upon mediato: or arhitiarm :

('\er^ec ;he diminution n; mania;

pi Dpei ty. ' I he pai ties ai e t :> joii itl; ' pa> fc r tl lis ai bitratioi 1 ai id are to cooperate in good faith
ii 1 that process.
8.

1 1 le Coi n it finds tl lat the marital estate is encompassed by all property, of every

nature, accumulated either in the sole or joint names of the parties during the term of their
cohabitation from October 1, 1.985 through, the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce. The
Court finds that this property includes but is not him - '

'

/••:;.:

-• "

- . .

the heating, cooling ana insulation businesses operated n\ the Sciendum the manial residence
on "7492 West Jefferson Road, Manna, llKili ill

ml il uioprit, n l\1*i Smith >nn Hi-i

Draper, Htalr -ha fmi: p!c> icnta! property at .^b()7 South ^2.^ Y\V^\ W i \ \'alle\ C "it\ , 1 tab:
me nan

^

•

"h a ca^h \ aim1 on

(he lil'' «-' Rohrria Harr . the a:oAmobile- -wneelers, and vehicles consisting of 1988 Lincoln,
199.s

.
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. •.. les; the wedding rings purchased by

Defendant for Plaintiff; the bank accounts and any and all other assets purchased by both parties
during the designated time.
9.

The parties are to cooperate as needed to sign titles, transfer property, and to do

other things needed to effectuate the terms of this Decree and implement the Court orders
herein.
10.

Plaintiff is entitled to return to.her maiden name of "Hammond."

DEAN N. ZABRISKIE
Attorney for Defendant

4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
_.:u' :•>•_• J u; :v mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing,
I.ARATION OF MARRIAGE AND DECREE OI JJI\ ORCE, this >£? day of

^~^ZL_-

V?n, to:

v.:. i>-,1 \ N. Zabriskie
Jamestown Square
ll'inover Building, Suite 370
3507 North University Avenue
Provo, UT 84604

S8\23417.dmd
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RIED $*'-•

Thire* J-,T;C..?.' >.- .'.

SEP

SUZANNE MARELi
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETV.- •
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
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By_
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COTUT
IN" AND FOR S 41 J LAM. < MINI \
00O00

LINDA KAY CLARK,
ni

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ainrr:

I Kill I

I II ili"i|k
Case Ni
- 4244 DA
Judge:!. Dennis Frederick

Defendant
-00O00-

The above-entitled matter came before the Court; :-.-•.
r

Honor
'.:JV-

j

- i - - ; - j i,.„

Suzanne Marelius. .«

:

i! on A ugiist

h

^

.vi mil was present in person and represented by

: a^at was present in person and represented by counsel, Dean

a Declaration of Marriage is made, that the marital assets would be jointly appraised and the

•joinm<v. :jVv marriage existed, the Court heard the testimony of witnesses, received evidence,
rewevvd ,.

... ncTeii: winj OLAIC I.\.

cause appearing does make and enter the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court has considered evidence on the issue of whether the parties have met

the requirements for a common law marriage set forth in the statute at UCA §30-1-4.5. The
Court finds that the evidence establishes that the parties have met all legal requirements of that
statute and should be declared married.
2.

On the common law marriage elements, the Court finds that the evidence

establishes the following:
a.

Both parties to this action are of legal age and capable of giving consent

to a marital relationship;
b.

The parties to this action are both legally capable of entering into a

solemnized marriage and in fact were previously married and divorce from one another by
Decree entered in the Third Judicial Court of Summit County, State of Utah on or about August
27, 1985;
c.

The parties to this action have cohabited and the Court finds that

cohabitation to have commenced on or about October 1, 1985, and continued until the final
separation of the parties on August 28, 1996, when the Defendant changed the locks on the
residence and Plaintiff relocated to a separate home;
d.

The parties to this action mutually assumed marital rights, duties and

obligations in numerous ways which will be set forth elsewhere in these findings;
e.

The parties to this action mutually held themselves out as wife and

husband, and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as wife and husband. Among the
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evidence supporting this factor is the consistent filing of joint, married income tax returns with
the federal and state tax authorities from 1985 through 1994 (this return was filed 10-1-95 and
was the last tax return filed before the separation).
3.

The Court finds that the parties mutually assumed marital rights, duties and

obligations and have acquired a general reputation as a married couple and relies on the
following specific evidence established at trial:
a.

Within a few months of their formal divorce in 1985, the parties

commenced cohabitation and consistently lived together until August 28, 1996;
b.

The parties built a home together in Coalville, Utah, shortly after resuming

cohabitation. They later moved to Magna, Utah with their children and purchased a residence
in 1988 on 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah. The parties lived in this residence together
until the final separation and jointly maintained, improved, paid for and enjoyed the benefits of
this home ownership;
c.

In late 1985, the parties resumed parenting their children together until

they reached the age of majority or were emancipated;
d.

The Plaintiff retained the married name of "Clark" and used this

throughout the period of cohabitation, with Defendant's knowledge and consent;
e.

The Defendant purchased a new set of wedding rings for the Plaintiff in

1989 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 16);
f.

The parties established joint credit as a married couple would do with

Sears and JC Penney's (Plaintiffs Exhibit 17);
3

g.

The parties established and maintained joint bank accounts for several years

during their relationship, in addition to having separate accounts. The Court finds that there was
no formal distinction during the relationship of the parties as to whether joint living expenses
were paid from separate or joint accounts, and that said funds appear to be entirely commingled
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, 7, 8 11 and 27);
h.

The parties filed joint income tax returns claiming the marital deduction

from 1985 through 1994, which was the last return filed prior to separation. These returns
reflect that all property whether titled in the separate or joint names of the parties was described
as marital property and both parties shared the tax impact of rental income, depreciation, etc.,
on such properties without distinction (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5);
i.

During the relationship the Defendant established several businesses which

were operated together by the parties. These included Sonny's Heating and Air Conditioning,
Mark and Sonny's Heating and Air Conditioning, K & S Properties. The Plaintiff worked on
a full-time basis in these businesses doing bookkeeping, payroll, tax filings, record keeping,
scheduling, and other general office work.

Plaintiff was not paid a formal salary for these

services and testified that she was working towards the betterment of the family finances and to
augment the value of joint businesses. It is clear that Defendant relied on Plaintiff's ongoing
services in this regard and that these businesses are jointly acquired marital assets;
j.

During the relationship the parties acquired personal belongings together

and acquired real estate together, including the marital residence, the family businesses, a lot
on Skyline Drive, rental property in Draper and a four-plex.
4

At various times during the

relationship these assets were titled either in the separate names of the parties or joint names,
as circumstances arose;
k.

During the relationship in approximately 1991, the parties each prepared

a last will and testament which were reciprocal documents where each party left all interest in
their property to the other party (Plaintiffs Exhibit 14, 15);
1.

During the relationship the parties routinely introduced one another as

"husband" or "wife" and in particular, Defendant would make this introduction with the Plaintiff
when he hired new employees for his business. The Court finds the testimony of Mr. Jon Nash,
a neighbor and friend of the parties for five years and that he assumed the parties were married
and did not know that they were not formally married until the time of their separation in
December 1995 as credible and reliable evidence on the reputation of the parties as married.
The Court finds the testimony of Lisa Hart, the girlfriend of the parties' son since January 19,
1993, and who also stayed with the parties for about three (3) weeks to care for Kelly Clark,
that she believed the Clark's were married, based on their conduct and representations to her
until Mr. Clark introduced her to a "girlfriend" at a later time, to be credible and reliable
testimony on the conduct and reputation of the parties as married;
m.

The parties acquired vehicles together and paid for these vehicles from

both joint and separate funds. The evidence establishes that Defendant bought a new 1994
Dodge Ram pickup truck on July 2, 1994, and that Plaintiff paid the $5,000.00 down payment
from her separate bank account (Plaintiffs Exhibit 9) which was later repaid to her by the
Defendant);
5

n.

During their relationship, the Plaintiff maintained insurance coverage on

the Defendant's 1994 Dodge truck and paid for this from her separate account (Plaintiffs Exhibit
10);
o.

Shortly after the parties resumed cohabitation, the Defendant restored

Plaintiff as the primary beneficiary on his life insurance policy on April 15, 1986 (Plaintiffs
Exhibit 12);
p.

During the relationship, the parties paid jointly on life insurance for

Defendant's mother, Roberta A. Clark, which premiums were paid from joint funds Plaintiff's
Exhibit 13);
q.

Even during the separation of the parties which began December 1995,

during their period of cohabitation, the Defendant would on occasion stay overnight with the
Plaintiff and paid her first and last months rent and separate expenses, such as car repairs from
his own funds (Plaintiffs Exhibit 20);
r.

Throughout the cohabitation of the parties and as recently as May 1996,

on Plaintiff's birthday, the Defendant sent cards expressing his love and affection for the
Plaintiff (Plaintiffs Exhibit 21).
4.

The parties purchased a marital residence at 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna,

Utah, in 1988. Upon purchase of this residence, it was titled solely in the name of Plaintiff,
Linda K. Clark even though the home was purchased with the joint funds of the parties. It is
undisputed that this was done to preserve the asset during Defendant's bankruptcy proceedings.
Thereafter, the parties entered into a written agreement dated June 26, 1992, wherein they
6

agreed that Plaintiff would Quit Claim her entire equity and interest in the residence to
Defendant for the sum of $22,500.00 payable in installments of $300.00 per month. The parties
both testified that Defendant came up with this number based on his own opinion that the home
was worth approximately $50,000.00 and that this was a fair value after the deduction of certain
joint debts. The Defendant made payments under this agreement and often missed payments for
as long as ten (10) months. In approximately June 1996, the Defendant made a balloon payment
completing the financial terms of this agreement and Plaintiff executed a Quit Claim Deed
transferring the entire property to Defendant.

Plaintiff claims that she entered into this

agreement under duress and pressure from the Defendant and that it was never intended to be
a true agreement.
5.

The Court finds the Plaintiffs claims of duress and intimidation by the Defendant

relating to the June 1992, agreement are credible and finds that the agreement is of no force and
effect and is void. The Court finds Plaintiffs testimony credible that she would receive the
$300.00 payments and would routinely deposit those either in the parties joint account or her
separate account or otherwise use those funds directly for the regular joint expenses of the
parties such as groceries. The Court finds Plaintiff to be a timid, unassertive individual who
could be easily pressured to enter into such an agreement by the Defendant. The Court finds
Defendant to be overbearing and capable of intimidation towards the Plaintiff. The Court finds
credible the testimony of the parties' son, Kelly Clark that the Defendant is intimidating and
would routinely take advantage of individuals for financial gain. The Court finds clear and
convincing evidence that Plaintiff felt compelled to sign this deed and did not have a full and
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fair opportunity to consult counsel or otherwise reflect on the consequences of her actions. The
deed was prepared by Attorney Nolan Olsen, who was the divorce attorney for Defendant and
who, for many years, had been the Defendant's friend and business attorney. The Court finds
that this was not an arms length, fair transaction and that equity requires that the Agreement and
deed be set aside and given no force and effect.
6.

Based on the Court finding that the agreement dated June 26, 1992, is null and

void, the Court also sets aside the Quit Claim Deed, dated April 10, 1996, by Plaintiff to
Defendant, transferring her interest in the marital residence. The Court finds that the marital
residence at 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah, is a joint marital asset of the parties.
7.

The Plaintiff is requesting an award of alimony. The Court finds that Plaintiff

is currently employed full-time earning $10.00 per hour, which is a gross monthly wage of
$1,720.00 and that she has a net monthly income of $1,309.00. The Court finds Plaintiff's
Exhibit 26 to be an accurate statement of Plaintiffs income and expenses and finds that
Plaintiffs reasonable monthly expenses are $2,409.00 per month. Plaintiff has shown a need
for alimony.
8.

The Defendant has testified that he is unaware of his current income. The Court

recognized Mr. Clark's reluctance to testify as to what his current income is for purposes of
alimony, which the Court finds to be troubling and not credible. The evidence has shown
inconsistencies in Defendant's statements of his income depending on the purpose for which it
is being made, such as an application for credit or for purposes of divorce. The Court finds
Plaintiffs Exhibit 39, the Uniform Residential Loan Application a verified document completed
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by Defendant, June 20, 1996, to be the best evidence of Defendant's current income and finds
that income to be at least $5,376.00 gross per month.

It is clear that during the recent

cohabitation of the parties, they acquired considerable assets and have had a very comfortable
style of living. Plaintiffs Exhibit 30, the loan application completed by Defendant states his net
worth to be $477,118.00. It is clear that the Defendant has the ability to pay alimony.
9.

The Plaintiffs request for $1,000.00 a month for alimony is appropriate and the

Court awards her that amount retroactive to September 1, 1996. Plaintiff is thus awarded a
judgment against the Defendant for alimony accumulated during the twelve (12) months this
matter has been pending, in the amount of $12,000.00. This judgment should bear interest at
the legal rate of 7.45% per annum until paid. Defendant should commence making ongoing
payments of alimony to Plaintiff effective September 1, 1997, which should be paid by the 1st
of every month thereafter. Alimony will be payable to Plaintiff until such time as she remarries,
cohabits, or until alimony has been paid for a term equaling the length of the marriage of the
parties, or until Plaintiffs death, whichever event occurs earlier.
10.

Plaintiff has requested costs and attorney's fees. The Court finds Plaintiff has

established a need for fees based on her income and that Defendant's income is more than twice
that of the Plaintiffs and he has an ability to pay Plaintiff her reasonable costs and fees. The
Court directs the Plaintiffs counsel to submit an Affidavit of Attorney's fees and costs under
Rule of Judicial Administration, 4-501 and that Defendant may file any objection to that request,
which the Court will consider under the terms of that Rule.
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11.

The Court finds that all property acquired during the marital relationship, which

extends between October 1, 1985 and the date of the entry of the Divorce to be marital assets.
The Court finds those marital assets to comprise at least the heating, cooling and insulation
businesses operated by the Defendant, the marital residence on 7492 West Jefferson Road,
Magna, Utah, the rental property at 12251 South 500 West, Draper, Utah, the four-plex rental
property at 3667 South 3325 West, West Valley City, Utah, the trailer and lot on Skyline Drive
in Sanpete County, the life insurance with a cash value on the life of Roberta Clark, the
snowmobiles, 4-wheelers, and vehicles consisting of 1988 Lincoln, 1995 Ford pick-up truck, and
business equipment and vehicles, the wedding rings purchased by Defendant for Plaintiff, the
bank accounts and any and all other assets purchased during the appropriate time by both parties.
The Court approves the parties stipulation that all assets will be appraised at the joint cost of the
parties, with jointly agreed upon appraisers. Thereafter, the parties will mutually select and pay
for a mediator or arbitrator to make a final division of marital assets between the parties. Both
parties have agreed to be bound by the decision of that arbitrator.
12.

Plaintiff is entitled to return to her maiden name of "Hammond."

13.

The Court finds that during the marital relationship of the parties, they

encountered irreconcilable differences and that a divorce should be granted to Plaintiff to be final
upon entry.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its Conclusions
of Law:

10

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a Declaration of Marriage based on the finding that the

elements of the Common Law Marriage Statute at UCA §30-1-4.5 have been met;
2.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds

of irreconcilable differences, said divorce to become final upon entry.
3.

The Court should enter such orders regarding alimony, division of assets and

liabilities as are consistent with the Findings of Fact.

DEAN N. ZABRISKIE
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this JO_ day of S>
1997, to:
Mr. Dean N. Zabriskie
Jamestown Square
Hanover Building, Suite 370
3507 North University Avenue
Provo, UT 84604
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LINDA KAY CLARK,

:
:
:

Plaintiff,
v.

:

CECIL E. CLARK,

:
Defendant.

:
:

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE

Case No.
Judge

ooOoo
Plaintiff

complains and alleges against

Defendant

as

follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State

of Utah, and has been so for more than three months prior to the
filing of this Complaint.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband and

were married for 18 years prior to divorcing in 1985. A few months
after the divorce, the parties commenced living together and have
established a common law relationship since that date through their
separation in September, 1996.
1

3.

During the course of their common law marriage, the

parties have encountered differences of an irreconcilable nature
making a continuation of the marital relationship impossible•
4.

The parties have had two children together namely

Kelly Clark born September 2, 1971 and Lisa Clark born August 1,
1968.

Both these children are past the age of majority.
5.

residence,

During
real

the

property

marriage
and

the

other

parties

improvements

acquired

a

including

furniture, fixtures and appliances at 7492 West Jefferson Road,
Magna, Utah

84044.

It is reasonable that the use and occupancy of

this property be awarded to the Plaintiff until further order of
the Court.
6.
the

parties

property,

During their marriage and common law relationship,
have

personal

acquired
property,

certain

business

vehicles

and

interests,
other

assets

real
and

Plaintiff alleges that each party should fully disclose to the
other the exact nature and extent of such assets and that the same
should

be awarded

on an equitable

basis between the parties,

subject to any existing debt thereon, as determined by the Court.
These assets should be divided pursuant to common law principles
and alternatively under the theory of partnership^ contract for
services or trust.

2

7.

Since their marriage, the parties have

certain liabilities and obligations.

incurred

Plaintiff alleges that each

party should fully disclose the exact nature and extent of such
debt to the other and that the parties should be ordered to assume,
pay and discharge the same as determined by the Court.
8.

That

during

the pendency

of

the

above-entitled

action Plaintiff alleges that the parties should be restrained and
enjoined from transferring, disposing of or changing the form or
nature of assets, and from incurring any additional liabilities
other than as may be mutually agreed to by the parties or otherwise
ordered by the Court.
9.
to

execute

That each of the parties hereto should be required
such

deeds, conveyances, bills

of

sale

and

other

documents and instruments needed to transfer the respective party's
interest in and to the property awarded by the Court and title
thereto.
10.

That the Plaintiff has retained the services of

counsel in this action and should be awarded such fees and costs as
are charged for services incurred in connection herewith.
11.

That

the

Defendant

is

currently

employed

as

a

business owner of "Sonny's Heating and Air Conditioning", Mark &
Sonny's Heating and Air Conditioning", among other activities which
generate

income, and

it

is

reasonable
3

that

Defendant

pay

to

Plaintiff permanent alimony in such sum and amount as the Court
shall determine.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That she be granted a divorce from the Defendant on

the grounds of irreconcilable differences, said divorce to become
final upon entry.
2.

That the Court enter such orders as are reasonable

regarding support, and division of assets and liabilities as are
alleged herein above.
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

fair.
DATED this

day of

1996.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

SUZANNE MARELIUS
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's address:
3542 Candis
Magna, Utah

84044
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STATE OF UTAH

)
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ss.

LINDA KAY CLARK, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes
and says that she has read the foregoing Complaint for Divorce and
knows and understands the contents thereof and the same is true as
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
1
2
3 LINDA KAY CLARK,

Case Ho. DGA 9G4904244 DA

4

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
OF JUDGE'S RULING

5

Plaintiff,
vs .

6 CECIL E. CLARK,

>V&

7

Au^^r

Defendant.

8
9

?**>r

/
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF J U D ^

10
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
11
on Wednesday, August 13, 199 7
12
13
14 APPEARANCES:
15 For the Plaintiff:
16
17
18 For the Defendant:
19
20

SUZANNE MARELIUS
Attorney at Lav/
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
(301) 531-0435

84102

DEAN N. ZABRISKIE
Attorney at Law
3507 North University Avenue #370
Provo, Utah 84604
(801) 375-7630

21
22
23
24
25

ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR
License Mo. 22-106796-7301
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 535-5203
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1
2 I

THE COURT:

All right.

I have done a number of

3

these cases where there's a claim of common law marriage,

4

since the advent of this statute which some may argue is

5

ill-conceived, but nevertheless,

6

fit to legitimize common law relationships under certain

7

limited circumstances, and since that time, I've had

8

occasion to rule on a number of these, and in this instance

9

I am persuaded that the overwhelming evidence is that there

our legislature has seen

10 was a marital relationship post divorce of 1985, which,
11 coincidentally, I granted.
12

The persuasive, credible evidence is that within a

13 matter of a few months of the time of that original divorce,
14 which was granted in August of 1985, Exhibit 1, these parties
15 were back living together as early potentially as October
16 of 1985.

They built a home together.

They moved to a home

17 in Magna together with their two children.
18 their children to the age of majority.
19 last name of Clark.

They raised

They used the common

They drafted wills which while state

20 they are separate individuals and single individuals, the
21 content

of the wills is that they leave to each other their

22 entire estate, Exhibits 14 and 15.
23

The defendant bought rings for the plaintiff,

24 Exhibit IS.

There was a joint use of credit accounts,

25 Exhibit 17.

They maintained joint bank accounts, Exhibit 6.
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1 assumed the rights and obligations and duties of a marriage
2 relationship, and lastly, held themselves out as husband and
3 wife.

At least, it was implicit in their relationship

4 that they indeed were husband and wife.
5

Consequently, I determine that there was a common

6 law marriage up to the date of August of 1996, at which
7 time then the separation, the final separation occurred.
8

I am, moreover, of the view that the claim of

9 intimidation, duress, overbearing conduct on the part of the
10 defendant vis-a-vis the plaintiff here is a believable
11 claim.
12

Now, it may well be in the objective world, Mr.

13 Clark's attitude and conduct is not such that one would
14 find him to be overbearing or intimidating, but my observa15 tion of the respective parties here is that Ms. Clark,
16 number one, is a person of considerable timidness, and I
17 am of the view, therefore, that her execution of the deed
18 incident to the Magna property was a situation she felt
19 compelled to do, did not obtain independent counsel;
20 indeed, used Mr. Olson who had been the longtime counsel of
21 Mr. Clark and in fact represented him at the original
22 divorce trial or stipulated divorce, and therefore find
23 by clear and convincing evidence that she would not, but for
24 these circumstances, have executed that deed for the sum of
25 money that she received, that her will was overwrought, that

4
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1 and that her claim for alimony in the amount of $1,000 per
2 month is neither exorbitant, nor is it in appropriate.
3

I believe that she's shown a need for that and

4 consequently award $1,000 per month in the form of alimony
5 to terminate on the earliest of the typical conditions, and
6 that that shall be retroactive to the month of September
7 of 1996.
8

In addition, I award to the plaintiff reasonable

9 attorney's fees to be determined pursuant to Rule 4-501 of
10 the Code of Judicial Administration.
11

You submit to me an affidavit, and to Mr. Zabriskie

12 likewise, Ms. Marelius, the amount of your fees, and then
13 he will have the opportunity to object, and I will then
14 rule pursuant to 4-501 on the reasonableness of the fees to
15 be awarded here.
16

The properties acquired during the course of this

17 marital term that I have now defined are deemed to be and I
18 consider them to be marital properties and therefore, the
19 parties may and wil 1 submit the issue of distribution to
20 binding arbitration as they have stipulated.
21

Now, are there any questions?

22

MS. MARELIUS:

Ms. Marelius?

My client would like to be awarded

23 her name of Hammond, if v/e could add that to the Decree so
24 it's clear.
25
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(Whereupon, 11 Ie proceedings were concluded.)
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3
4
5

STATE OF UTAH

6 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss
)

7
8

I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify:

9

That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License

10 No. 22-106796-7801, and one of the official court reporters
11

of the state of Utah; that on the 13th day of August, 1997,

12

I attended the within matter and reported in shorthand the

13 proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said
14

shorthand proceedings to be transcribed into typewriting,

15

and the foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 7, inclusive,

16

constitute a full, true and correct account of the Judge's

17

Ruling only, to the best of my ability.

18

DATED AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, this 20th day of

19 August, 1997.
20
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i:r. eiiv i.-sing herewith 'the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law am.1 a
m of Marriage and Decree of Divorce, which, I have drafted in the above-matter.
i iva5e review these and if they are acceptable, indicate your approval, as to form and, return them
to me for filing in Court.
ere is any question or problem with the content of any of these documents, please
call ilk ;o discuss that.
ould like • , JH ^. mat we select a red! , ...
.
-dibcib as soon as
lease call me to discuss who you might have .
ii:/r ^ks. I also would
> be informed \\'.e f :\ M Clark will pay the $!2,i'KKi ^ arrears and the $1,000.00 in
judgment for attorney's fees incurred in the pendency of this matter. Please have him make
these payments through my office and if he will not be paying these as a lump sum,,, please
communicate with me what payment terms he is proposing.
I look forward to hearing from you. in 'this matter,
Siiieeu'I'i,
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The Honorable L Dennis Frederick
Third District Court
240 East 400 South. #503
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re; Unda Kay Clark vs. Cecil E. Clark
Case No.: 964904244 DA
Dear Judge Frederick:
1 am submitting the enclosed proposed Findings and Declaration of Marrjag^ pursuant
trauie 4-304(2), Code of Judicial Admmistrationr i supplied a copy of these documents August
Zo, 1997, to Attorney Zabriskie aiKl made numerous changes based on his comments,
submitted revised copies September 10, 1997, for his approval as to form and he has not
returned them to me approved or filed an objection. I presume the enclosed documents are thus
acceptable.
I ask iliac you review and execute these documents so they can be entered on the C ourt
record. 1 am sending a copy of this letter to Attorney Zabriskie, notifying him that if he has
further objections, he must file those in a formal matter with the Court. Thank you for your
consideration.
Respectfully,
Ill I L l v H L u

in. ' h T I R J m N

Suzanne I lareli LIS
SM.ngp
Enclosures)
cc:
Dean Zabriskie
Linda Clark
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'DICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LINDA KAY CLARK,

:
r.R ,'N SECON, M '/. ^
'OMPEL DISCOVE;
'-;""

Plaintiff,
v.
CE»

Case No. 964904244 DA
Judge J, Dennis Frederick

Defendant,

--^oOooTh^ Plaintiff's Morion for Contempt -

1

presiding*
c

• • - . . .

: j.-"

'onorable Commissioner

Plaintiff was oreserr
-:.

Lisa

n

Jones

prison and represent!
.; . not present nor was ^ ,

appearance mace by counse, ^n nis behalf.

Counsel for Plaint ill

proffered that there had been a partial "r?Dons- "
.*..-'. _

o

.sponses came before the „ _ L : C ..eaiin^

Compel :
April

"" - - --

. errogator ies, however.

the discovery
*e^n no wr_, in

responses to the Request for Production c : Documents :.c: v.-re :,: .
docuTTtfcnts other than some tax returns

1

proffer, the Court record and file herein, the Court makes the
following Findings and Recommendation for Court Order:
1.

The Plaintiff initiated discovery in October 1996,

provided a reminder letter that responses were overdue on November
26, 1996 and filed a First Motion to Compel which was scheduled for
hearing March 6, 1997.

That hearing was resolved by Stipulation

and an Order entered April 7, 1997, requiring Defendant to comply
with complete discovery responses by March 13, 1997, and pay fees
of $250.

There has been no compliance by the Defendant.
2.

The Plaintiff filed a second Motion to C^jnpel on

March 20, 1997, and by the date of the hearing there had only been
a partial, deficient response.
for

failure

to

abide

by

the

The issue of Defendant's contempt
Court

Orders

herein

concerning

discovery is hereby certified for evidentiary hearing.
3.

Based on the record of noncompliance herein, and the

available sanctions set forth in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
37(b).

The Defendant's pleadings will be stricken and his cfefault

entered in the above entitled matter unless full and complete
responses to the discovery served by Plaintiff are received by
Plaintiffs counsel within ten days of entry of the order.
4.

The Plaintiff is awarded a judgment in the amount of

$500 payable by Defendant which will bear legal interest at the

2

rate of 7.45% per annum until paid.

This judgment arises from the

attorneys fees required for the attorney's Motions to Compel.
5.

If Defendant's pleadings are stricken, Plaintiff may

submit an Affidavit as to her current expenses and the Court will
consider Plaintiff's request for a specific amount of alimony.
ML*

DATED this _JftTaay of

, 1997

HONORA£L£TJT.' DENNIS "^FREDERICK
Diytr-ccw Court Judge
RECOMMENDATION OF COMMISSIONER
Commissioner Lisa Jones, having heard the above matter,
herewith recommends that the foregoing Order be entered in this
matter.
DATED rffi^ day of April, 1997.

LJISSAAS ^C . JONES
JONE
Commissioner

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER ON SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY RESPONSES, this

/ ^ f d a y of April, 19 97, to:

Dean Zabriskie, Esq.
Hanover Building, Suite 37 0
James Town Square
3507 No. University Ave.
Provo, UT 84604
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
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LINDA KAY CLARK,

Case No. 964904244

6
7
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Plaintiff,

5

CECIL E. CLARK,

HEARING, 8-31-98
Defendant.

8

9
110
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 31st day

11
12

of August, 1995, at 9:00 o'clock a.m., this cause

13

came on for hearing before the HONORABLE J. DENNIS

14

FREDERICK, District Court, without a jury in the Salt

J15

Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.

116
17
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18

For the Plaintiff:

SUZANNE MARELIUS
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney at Law
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Page 2
but - finding that there is a marriage declared by
law must be entered, if at all, within one year of
the date of the separation of the parties or the last
time that they cohabited together.
I would point out that this matter came
on for trial on August 14th, 1997, and the Court
found that the parties separated for the final time
on August 28th. The Court issued a ruling from the
bench on this matter on August 14th, which gave
plenty of time, two weeks, for an issuance of an
order in this case, but the order --1 believe the
certificate of mailing of the order indicates that it
went to Mr. Zabriskie my predecessor Counsel, in
September of 1997, and it was not entered by this
Court until September of 1990 - 1997; as
specifically it went to Mr. Zabriskie on September
10th, and the order was issued on September 29th.
It is our position that this Court went
to some length to have a trial and to expedite the
matter and to have that trial within the one-year
statute, that there was ample time of two weeks after
the issuance of the Court's ruling from the bench,
that there was no order ~ proposed order submitted
to this Court and, in fact, not until about two weeks
after the applicable one year time period had

Page 3
Page 1
1
PROCEEDINGS
1 expired.
2
THE COURT: This is the time and place
2
The case law in this State and
3 for the hearing on the Defendant's motion to dismiss
3 specifically in Bunch v. Inglehorn (Phonetic) is very
4 in the matter of Linda K. Clark versus Cecil E.
4 clear that it is not the date of filing, it's not the
5 Clark, Case No. 964904244.
5 date of trial, it's not the date of the oral ruling,
6
Counsel, start your appearances for the
6 it is the date of entry of the order; and submission
7 record, please.
7 of the Proposed Order on September 10th is simply
8
MS. CORPORON: Mary Corporon for the
8 untimely. We've gone past our time period and within
9 Defendant.
9 the holding in Bunch v. Inglehorn and the clear
10
MS. MARELIUS: Suzanne Marelius for the
10 language of the statute is this entire action has to
11 Petitioner.
11 be dismissed at this point. The Court lost
12
MS. CORPORON: And we are the moving
12 jurisdiction as of August 27th, 1997, to enter any
13 party, Your Honor.
13 orders finding or declaring a marriage in this case.
14
THE COURT: Very well, Counsel. I've
14
I'll submit it.
15 reviewed the respective memoranda both in support and 15
THE COURT: All right. Thank you,
16 in opposition to the motion.
16 Ms. Corporon.
17
Ms. Corporon, you may proceed.
17
Ms. Marelius?
18
MS. MARELIUS: Your Honor, there are a
18
MS. CORPORON: Thank you. This is our
19 number of legal, practical and equitable reasons that
19 motion to dismiss, for lack of subject matter
20 this Court should deny the motion to dismiss. The
20 jurisdiction in this Court to issue the order which
21 was issued declaring a common-law marriage as between] 21 Court found this relationship by its findings in the
22 disputed order ended August 28th, '96. We had close
22 these parties and then ordering other relief as
23 of evidence, bench ruling, minute entry, all occurred
23 between the parties, that is for violation of Section
24 August 14th, within that one-year time period.
24 30-1-4.5 requiring that any order finding a
25
We also sent, contrary to what Counsel
25 common-law marriage - and I use that term, I guess,
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1 indicates, Proposed Findings and Decree to Counsel
1 Court that the common-law marriage existed.
2 Zabriskie August 25th, again, within the one-year;
2
I think it's also reasonable — another
3 and we've attached as Exhibit, I think, A and B to
3 approach to this is to view Petitioner's filings as
4 our Memorandum, my cover letter just to the Court of
4 having complied with this one-year statute. There's
5 September 26th, saying that I sent the first draft
5 two parts to the statute. The first part talks about
6 August 25th, and then we also had our mailing
6 entry of an order and the elements to establish a
7 certificate on the first draft.
7 common-law marriage; the second part says that the
8
After a bench trial the Rules provide 15
8 determination or establishment of a marriage under
9 days for presenting opposing Counsel with the draft
9 the section must occur within one year of terminating
10 pleadings, that was done. There were revisions,
10 the relationship. I don't think it is clear that the
11 language "termination" or "establishment" means entry
11 changes requested. That was done. An then new
12 pleadings were presented, and Counsel never sent them 12 of an order. I think it can certainly mean
13 everything that the Court did here at the close of
13 back. And so my transmit letter of September
14 evidence ruling, minute entry, that kind of a
14 indicates that was the status. And based on that the
15 Court did enter these documents September 29th, a few 15 finding. So I think that's an open question under
16 Utah law.
16 weeks beyond the one-year time limit.
17
The Bunch Case is distinguishable. It
17
So, I think it is undisputed that the
18 Court found all the elements of a common-law marriage 18 does appear to be the only guiding case we have in
19 existed after the 12-year relationship of these
19 Utah, and that relates very specifically to the fact
20 that filing a complaint for common law marriage
20 parties, which, in fact, came after an 18-year formal
21 within one year is not enough. That's all that
|
21 marriage. The Court essentially found that there had
22 holding really relates to.
22 been no change in their relationship and actions
23
I think another reason here, very
23 towards one another.
24
I would point out that the Petitioner
24 significant, is that to enter a nunc pro tunc order
25 also pled alternate theories in this case. We pled
25 - to not do that would allow Mr. Clark to benefit

i
Page 5
Page 7
i 1 partnership, resultant trust, constructive trust and
l from this - the kinds of delays that I think were so
I 2 frustrating to us at the time of trial. And I think
2 equitable theories, which the Court did not rule on.
3 We relied, the Court also relied, also primarily on
3 the Court should be mindful of that. This is the
4 the common-law theory.
4 case where we had two contempt orders entered. We
5
I think the prime fact of allowing the
5 had discovery served in October, motion for contempt
6 motion to dismiss would simply result in a new trial
6 in January that was granted, motion for contempt in
7 on these alternate theories. It would serve no
7 April. Never had she responded to that discovery.
8 purpose. And that would, I think, be at great cost
8 April, the commissioner struck the pleadings, entered
9 to these parties. There is an appeal pending. They,
9 an order of marriage. That was not signed because
10 of course, vested in that whole litigation process.
10 there was a motion to set aside. But that bought
11 That would cause another delay. And I think those
11 Mr. Clark a six-month delay. We came into this court
12 things are equally prejudicial to both parties.
12 without complete discovery, and that's where we had
13
We have filed a motion to enter this
13 this somewhat unusual order of having to do the
14 order nunc pro tunc, which I think is the practical
14 appraisal and separation of property post-trial.
15 equitable solution. That statute only does allow a
15
The Petitioner in this case also tried
16 Court, in matters of divorce, annulment and
16 very hard to get a ruling, a summary judgment, as it
17 separation, to enter for a showing of good cause an
17 were, finding of the marriage. That was brought in a
18 order at a different date, and I would submit that
18 motion to the commissioner. The commissioner denied
19 it, said there was an evidentiary hearing needed,
19 date of trial three weeks earlier is the appropriate
20 that was recommended; the hearing was requested and
20 date that the Court should use to solve this
21 denied. The Court wanted to do everything at the
21 problem.
22 time of trial. So she certainly tried that.
22
I think also under just the equitable
23
The third area of delay here, the final
23 authority of this Court, in domestic matters and the
24 findings and decree were prepared and proposed before
24 best interests of justice, that these parties are
25 the one-year deadline and were simply held onto by
25 served by carrying out the ruling and findings of the
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1 Counsel. Whether that was deliberate or not, I don't
1 tunc to the day of trial.
2 know. But it certainly caused significant problems
2
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Marelius,
3 in this case.
3 thank you.
4
So I think it is fair to say that the
4
Do you wish to respond briefly,
5 Petitioner complied to the best of her ability to be
5 Ms. Corporon?
6 timely and complete and to complete this case in one
6
MS. CORPORON: Yes, Your Honor. After
7 year, and that would certainly suffice to establish
7 the request to issue a nunc pro tunc in this case, it
8 good cause for the application of a nunc pro tunc
8 is our position that once August 27th, 1997, had come
9 order.
9 and gone, this Court simply lost subject matter
10
One other area that I did brief, I'll
10 jurisdiction to do anything which includes a nunc pro
11 just touch on it briefly, and that is the
11 tunc order. And it is our position that that
12 Constitutional issues. The Court of Appeals in Bunch
12 deadline having passed this Court is lacking the
13 Footnote 3 addressed this problem themselves, they
13 jurisdiction and the power to issue the declaring the
14 could see it coming, that there was a potential equal
14 marriage.
15 protection violation under Article 24 of the Utah
15
All of the constitutional arguments are,
16 Constitution. The example the Court gave, and this
16 I submit, interesting academic arguments, but they
17 would just be in the normal course of events, that
17 don't apply to the facts in this case. It is
18 this application of this one year deadline would
18 absolute black letter law that courts do not reach
19 constitutional issues if the issues can be resolved
19 deprive a party of their rights:
20 on non-constitutional, statutory grounds.
20
"If a finding of common-law
21
In this particular case ~ and I wasn't
21
marriage was denied at trial, reversed
22 participating in the original trial in this, but it's
22
on appeal, remanded, the parties could
23 very clear to me from looking at the record that the
23
thus be denied the reasonable
24 Court and everyone bent over backwards to see that
24
opportunity to have that common-law
25 this trial came to trial before August 17. And it's
25
marriage determination within one year
Page 11
Page 9
1 really clear in reading the trial transcript that
1
through no fault of their own."
2 everyone took a very brisk approach to the trial
2
I think the case, as I've just discussed
3 process in order to get this done on August 14th,
3 in the brief Mayland v. Lewis applies so well to this
J 4 1997, so that the Court could make a ruling. And so
4 situation because it talks about the two types of
5 the Petitioner's claims and constitutional rights to
5 discrimination that Section 24 guards against, that a
6 get in here and have due process and to be heard by
6 law must apply equally to all persons within a class
7 this Court were not denied to her, were not taken
7 and if the classes are treated differently they must
8 away from her, she was not treated differently from
8 have -- based on differences that further the goals
9 other litigants in this particular case. And if
9 of the statute.
10 there's some potential for mischief in this statute,
10
In application, this one-year limit
11 it didn't happen here because everyone was aware of
11 creates these two classes: It creates a class of
12 this deadline and took measures, took appropriate
12 people that can bring their case entirely within one
13 measures to give the Petitioner a hearing. But then
13 year and those that can't. And I think the Court of
14 having had the hearing and with the Bunch v.
14 Appeals has noted that the failure to meet that one
15 Inglehorn Decision in 1995, some two years earlier,
15 year could be through no fault of the parties, it's
16 so that it's not some surprise sprung on everybody
16 simply inherent in the system we have. Discovery
17 after the fact, the Petitioner waits until August
17 delays are common. Motions are common. The domestic
18 25th to submit proposed documents by mailing and not
18relationscommissioner system, itself, gives us many,
19 to submit them to the Court.
19 many inherent delays. So I would submit no purpose
20
The presumption under Utah Rules of Civil
20 is served by this arbitrary creation of two classes
21 Procedure is that if those things are mailed on the
21 that can be justified, and there probably are some
22 25th, they don't even get to Mr. Zabriskie, my
22 serious constitutional defects.
23 predecessor Counsel, until August 28th, the three
23
I would urge the Court at this point to
24 days later that would be presumed or allowed for the
424 deny the motion to dismiss and enter this ~ just
25 mailing process, which is a day later than the
25 solve this problem by entering the order nunc pro
BILLIE WAY, CCT 801-364-4943
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Page 12
deadline for entry of this order. The problem is the
Petitioner didn't jump on the preparation of those
documents, get them to this Court quickly so that
Your Honor could enter them in a timely manner. And
that's - that's not the fault of the statute, that's
not the fault of this Court. And I would submit,
Your Honor, that it is appropriate to dismiss this
since the deadlines that are clearly enunciated were
violated. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right, Ms. Corporon.
Thank you.
It is particularly troubling to me to
enforce specific deadline-type language in equitable
matters such as domestic cases that are pending
before me. The reason is because we are, by rule, by
case law, expected to do equity in equitable matters
of this nature. However, the legislature has, for
whatever reason, determined that if these types of
marital relationships, that is unsolemnized
relationships, are going to be established, they must
meet certain specific guidelines to be established;
recognizing, of course, that prior to the advent of
30-1-4.5, common-law marriages of this nature were
not legally recognized. So, I suppose that when one
is faced with what appears to me to be quite specific
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language about the time frames in which this must be
accomplished, then my mandate, of course, is to
follow the language of the statute.
It is my recollection that all recognized
severity, the potential severity, of the imposed
deadlines in this statutory scheme, and we did,
indeed, move the matter along expeditiously to have
the matter tried within the one-year time frame. And
it was accomplished. And my rulings were made,
albeit not reduced to writing, and executed by myself
until the 29th of September, 1997, which is obviously
in excess of one year from the date that I determined
was the legal separation of these parties on August
28th of f 96.
In the face of language such as, "A
marriage that is not solemnized shall be legal and
valid if a court order establishes such," and
furthermore the language, "The determination or
establishment of a marriage under this section must
occur during the relationship or within one year
following the termination of that relationship," it
seems to me that there is little room for this Court
to engage in so-called equitable innovation.
Therefore, it seems to me that I am
compelled by the language of the statute and the time

1 don't really know what's happening in the matter in
2 terms of these parties' relationship, anyway.
3
MS. MARELIUS: I think the stay would
4 relate to no one selling or transferring, disposing
5 of marital assets.
6
THE COURT: is there objection to that
7 kind of an order?
8
MS. CORPORON: The problem, Your Honor,
9 is that Mr. Clark has been in significant financial
10 difficulties and one possible remedy is for him to be
11 able to encumber some of the real estate in order to
12 borrow money to be able to pay some of the creditors
13 that he has. But right now with being unable to sell
14 the real estate, encumber it to perform repairs on
15 it, do anything really imagined significantly, his
16 hands are tied and he is collapsing financially.
17
THE COURT: I think what I'm hearing at
18 this stage is that I'm not prepared to take any
19 action of that nature, Ms. Marelius. You can present
20 it to me in the proper format in the form of written
21 motion to which Counsel can object, and then I will
22 rule on it.
23
MS. MARELIUS: Your Honor, will you give
24 me ten days to do so 25
THE COURT: I will grant you ten days in

BILLIE WAY, CCT 801-364-4943
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frames applicable in this case to grant the motion to
dismiss.
And, Ms. Corporon, I will ask that you
prepare an appropriate order in that regard.
The fact that this matter is already
pending on appeal may well facilitate an expedited
ruling on the very issue that we are here dealing
with today. I don't know that, but this is an issue
that has not, other than the Bunch Case, which, if
anything, seemed to me to establish that the
appellate courts are going to look at specific
enforcement language and see that it's complied
with. But, nevertheless, it may well be that I'm
wrong. And if that is the case, then the matter is
pending and hopefully it can get the appellate court
to tell him so and we'll pick up the pieces
thereafter. But in the face of what I'm confronted
with now, I think I have no alternative but to grant
the motion to dismiss.
MS. MARELIUS: Based on that, Your Honor,
I would make a motion to stay this ruling pending my
being able to file a motion with the appellate court
to join this issue in the appeal.
THE COURT: I don't know if there's going
to be an objection, Ms. Corporon, from you about - I

Page 15 I
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which to file your motion, and then I will respond as
soon as I get a reply from you, Ms. Corporon. You
will prepare the appropriate order?
MS. CORPORON: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
MS. MARELIUS: There will be no disposal
or disbursement of property for ten days?
THE COURT: Ten days, the status quo will
remain in the effect.
MS. CORPORON: Thank, Your Honor.
(Hearing adjourned.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA KAY CLARK,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
CECIL E. CLARK,
Defendant(s),

:

MINUTE ENTRY RULING

:

CASE NO. 964904244 DA

:

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

:

Date:

October 16, 1998

:

After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice
to Submit for Decision filed October 8, 1998 and Notice to Submit
for Decision filed October 8, 1998, the Court rules as follows:
1. Petitioner's Motion to Stay is granted, there being no
timely opposition.
2. Petitioner's Motion to Supplement, etc. and Objection to
Order, etc. are denied.
3. Counsel for movant to prepare the order.

Case No. 964904244 DA
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I certify that on the 16th day of October, 1998, I sent by
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-ooOoo-

The Petitioner's Objection to Order Vacating Decree and Order of Dismissal; the
Petitioner's Motion for Stay and to Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce having come before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, were reviewed and the Court issued a Minute Entry Ruling thereon.
Based on the record and file herein, argument of counsel the Court makes the following
ruling:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

1.

The Petitioner's Motion to Stay the "Order Vacating Decree and Order of

Dismissal" issued in the above-referenced matter is granted. Neither party is to thus take any
action to sell, transfer, encumber or otherwise alienate or change the form or nature of assets
of either party during the pendency of this case and appeal.
2.

The Petitioner's Motion to Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law and Decree of Divorce and the Petitioner's Objection to Order Vacating Decree and
Order of Dismissal are denied.
DATED this Mfrfa

i
of

JJL^

. 1998.
BYtfflE

Approval As to Form:
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\W%, to:

30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out
of a contract between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the
provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and
general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section
must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one
year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
History: C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 246, § 2.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch.
246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chap-

ter 246, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of the chapter is to be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.

CHAPTER 4a
NUNC PRO TUNC ORDERS
Section
30-4a-l.

Authority of court

30-4a-l. Authority of court.
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good cause and giving of
such notice as may be ordered, enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter
relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage.
History: C. 1953, 30-4a-l, enacted by L.
1983, ch, 118, S 1.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UNDER ADVISEMENT
MINUTE ENTRY

Linda Kay Clark,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO: 964904244 DA
vs.
COMMISSIONER:
Lisa A. Jones

Cecil E. Clark,
Defendant.

The Commissioner having received proffers of testimony and argument from Counsel on
certain contested issues and having taken those contested issues under advisement, the
Commissioner now makes the following findings and recommendations:
1.

COMMON LAW MARRIAGE:
Plaintiff claims that the parties were married for eighteen years and in the almost

twelve years since the divorce have had an identical relationship to that of a married couple.
In 1992 plaintiff quit claimed her interest in the home in which defendant now lives for a
$22,000.00 payment in $300.00 per month monthly increments with a balloon payment in May
of 1996. Plaintiff now claims that to be an agreement entered into through duress. The parties
filed joint tax returns in 1993 and 1994.
Defendant responds that the parties were divorced in 1985 when there was a
property division and admits the parties lived together but after 1992 had no marital relationship
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and in fact made a division of their property in 1992 as evidenced by the payout for her share
of the marital property.

Defendant claims that the parties lived together from July through

September of 1992, from January through March 1993, from July 1993 through April 1994,
from May 1994 through September 1994, from March through October 1995 and for six weeks
starting July 1, 1996. Defendant claims that the statute's requirement that she make a claim for
common law marriage within one year has lapsed. Defendant married last August and is living
in the marital home.
The issue of the common law marriage is hotly disputed. Without an evidentiary
hearing with regard to the factors for a common law marriage and evidence regarding when the
parties were together and separated, the Commissioner cannot make a determination that a
common law marriage exists.

Without such a determination no relief plaintiff requests is

possible. The issue of the common law marriage is a trial issue and the parties should move
forward to trial. The issue of retroactivity with regard to the request for alimony is reserved
as a trial issue. Plaintiffs requests for alimony, possession of the home and suit costs on a
temporary basis are denied.

The parties agree that the temporary restraining order should

remain in effect and the Commissioner approves that stipulation.
2,

ORDER,
Attorney for plaintiff should prepare the appropriate order.

Dated this

day of November, 1996.

LISA A. JONES
DISTRICT COURT COMMISSIONER

CLARK V. CLARK
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following, this / L " ^ day of November, 1996.
Suzanne Marelius
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Dean Zabriskie
Thomas L. Low
Attorney for Defendant
Jamestown Square, Suite 370
Hanover Building
3507 North University Avenue
Provo, UT 84604
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CLARK, LINDA KAY

CASE NUMBER 964904244 DA
DATE 07/01/97
HONORABLE LISA A. JONES
COURT REPORTER NO TAPE
COURT CLERK GLN

PLAINTIFF
VS
CLARK, CECIL E
DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. MARELIUs, SUZANNE
D. ATTY. ZABRISKIE, DEAN N

COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS: SET FOR TRIAL ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES,
1. WHETHER COMMON LAW MARRIAGE EXISTS.
2. REAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION.
3. DEBT DISTRIBUTION.
4. ALIMONY.
5. ATTORNEY FEES.
6. CONTEMPT. VIOLATION OF RESTRAINT ON ASSETS.
COMMISSIONER'S S\JQCESTON

FDR

SETTLEMENT;

1. THE COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS A BIFURCATED HEARING ON THE
ISSUE OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE. THAT INITIAL HEARING WOULD
TAKE 1/2 DAY hj? MOST. FURTHER, THE STATUTORY LIMIT ON
ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARRIAGE IS LOOMING. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SETTLEMENT ONCE THE ISSUE OF COMMON
LAW MARRIAGE is DECIDED.

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
History: Const. 1896.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-

vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec.
26.

